ABSTRACT According to the growth of mobile devices equipped with a GPS receiver, a variety of locationbased services (LBSs) have been launched. Since location information may reveal private information, preserving location privacy has become a significant issue. Previous studies proposed methods to preserve a users' privacy; however, most of them do not take physical constraints into consideration. In this paper, we focus on such constraints and propose a location privacy preservation method that can be applicable to a real environment. In particular, our method anonymizes the user's location by generating dummies which we simulate to behave like real human. It also considers traceability of the user's locations to quickly recover from an accidental reveal of the user's location. We conduct an experiment using five users' real GPS trajectories and compared our method with previous studies. The results show that our method ensures to anonymize the user's location within a pre-determined range. It also avoids fixing the relative positions of the user and dummies, which may give a hint for an LBS provider to identify the real user. In addition, we conducted a user experiment with 22 participants to evaluate the robustness of our method against humans. We asked participants to observe movements of a user and dummies and try to find the real user. As a result, we confirmed that our method can anonymize the users' locations even against human's observation.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to growing popularity of mobile devices equipped with a GPS receiver, location based services (LBSs) are getting popular. LBS providers offer a variety of services based on a user's location information, such as local search, route planning, and location based advertisement. However, location information provides, or enables to infer, a lot of private information, e.g., where an LBS user lives, to which school his/her children go, where his/her friends live, etc. Krumm [17] warns about this problem. His experiment shows that only using the last location of a day, it is possible to estimate a user's home location within the range of 60 meter errors. The situation is more serious when the user continuously uses an LBS, such as searching near-by attractions during hanging around a city, since his/her accumulated location histories make private location detection easier. According to the investigation conducted by Busic and Filjar [7] , most of commercial LBSs require us to update our position every a few minutes. Beresford and Stajano [3] defined location privacy as the ability to prevent other parties from learning one's current or past location. They also warn that a system collecting users' locations potentially invade their location privacy.
To preserve users' location privacy, a lot of studies have been conducted. There are two requirements to deploy a system to preserve users' location privacy [24] : 1) it should be a closed system, i.e., being executable on the user's mobile device, not to leak the user's location information outside and 2) it should not disturb benefits of the user and LBSs. The second requirement is important to have the entire ecosystem beneficial, otherwise, no users and LBSs would use the privacy preservation system. Among the previous studies, dummy-based methods [16] , [20] , [26] satisfy these requirements. They generate dummy users and send their locations with the user's actual location to an LBS provider, so that the LBS provider cannot distinguish locations of the user and dummies. However, these previous methods do not consider physical constraints in a real environment, and thus, their actual robustness on privacy preservation is questionable. The robustness of a dummy-based method strongly depends on the naturalness of behavior of dummies. If dummies behave unlike human, it is easy to distinguish them as dummies, such as moving at unreasonable speed and being in the middle of the sea and top of the mountain.
In addition, traceability of locations is also a critical issue in a real environment. Since there is no perfect system, it is always possible that a user's location is accidentally revealed. If it happens, the revealed location may further reveal locations where the user was and is going to be. For example, if there are no dummies in a reachable area from the revealed location in the next query, it is apparent that the one in the area is the user. In this way, the user's past/future locations are to be traced based on the revealed location.
To solve these problems and preserve location privacy in a real environment, we have proposed a dummy-based privacy preservation method to anonymize the user's location in a real environment [24] . The method generates dummies around the user considering the real geographical information. Also it simulates the dummies' movement to make them natural during consecutive usage of the LBS. In this paper, we further improve the method to lower traceability of the user's locations and conduct experiments to evaluate the robustness of the method in detail.
In the experiment, we apply our method to 5 people's real GPS trajectories and quantitatively evaluate the robustness of the method from different aspects. The experimental results show that the proposed method can ensure that the user's location can be anonymous within the range of a required area size. Also they show that the proposed method avoids fixing relative positions of the user and dummies, which decreases a possibility to be inferred which location is the user's one. Additionally, the proposed method decreases the traceability from 10% to 40% lower than that of a baseline method. In addition, we ask humans to observe the movements of a user and generated dummies and try to identify which one is the real user. Such a user experiment is important to evaluate the real robustness of the privacy preservation methods, which has not been conducted in previous studies.
The contributions of this paper include:
• We propose a method that considers constraints in a real environment to generate natural dummies. It lowers traceability of users' locations to quickly recover from an accidental reveal of the user's location.
• Our method is highly practical that is directly applicable to the current ecosystem of LBSs. Specifically, a user and dummies share the user's own registration ID on an LBS, which enables the user to take membership benefits from the LBS while the LBS can obtain the user's rough location without the risk of invading his/her privacy.
• We conduct detailed experiments to evaluate the proposed method, including a user study with 22 participants, which shows real strength/weakness of the proposed method. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related work. Section III presents the details of the proposed method. Section IV describes the quantitative evaluation using people's real GPS tracks, followed by the user experiment in Section V. Finally, Section VI discusses outcomes of the performance evaluations and Section VII concludes the paper with future work discussion.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been a lot of studies to preserve location privacy. We categorize them into three approaches; 1) intermediates between a user and LBS, 2) transforms the user's location, and 3) generates dummy locations.
As for the first approach, the spatial cloaking [8] , [9] , [11] , [12] , [18] , [19] , [21] , [22] , [25] , [27] (or called as generalization [4] method) ensures to mix a user's location with at least k candidates, i.e., user's location cannot be identified over the probability of 1/k. It collects k users' locations and sends the minimum region including these k users to an LBS server as a query instead of a user's exact location. The hiding [3] method hides users' locations in a certain period. In this hiding period, users do not request an LBS and exchange their usernames with each other to make it difficult to connect their previous/next locations. By doing so, an adversary cannot trace a user's location history, even if it could identify the user's location at a certain timing. All of these methods need to pool users' locations, and thus assume a trusted thirdparty server to mediate interactions between the users and the LBS server [3] , [11] , [12] or uses peer-to-peer collaboration among mobile users [9] . However, it is practically difficult to deploy a completely safe third-party server. In addition, mobile peer-to-peer collaboration is suffered by the same location privacy problem, since users have to share their location information with whom they do not know. Moreover, these methods fail to anonymize the user's location if there is not enough number of users around.
As for the second approach, the obfuscation [2] , [6] , [10] method replaces a user's location with a near-by intersection or building to obscure the real location. However, if there is no appropriate target around the user, the substitute location must be far away from the user's location, which degrades the quality of an LBS service. The spatial transformation [15] method uses Hilbert curves to transform the user's location and sends the transformed location to the LBS. Since transformation is one-way, the LBS cannot decode the user's location. The disadvantage of this method is that it needs LBSs to transform all their location data (such as locations of shops), which is not a trivial effort on maintaining the services.
The last approach is the dummy-based approach [16] , [20] . As described in Section I, this approach generates dummies and sends their locations with the actual user's location to an LBS server. Fig. 1 shows an example; when a user generates a query of asking near-by restaurants, this approach sends the user's location with dummies' locations. Then the LBS provider returns lists of restaurants, which are close from each of the locations in the query (the user's and dummies' locations). The user can easily obtain the correct answer by simply filtering out unnecessary information on restaurants related to the dummies' locations.
As a practical solution to preserve location privacy, we should, of course, anonymize a user's location. At the same time, we should not disturb the benefits that users and LBS providers are supposed to take, otherwise the solution is unlikely used. For example, we can anonymize a user's location by simply using randomly generated pseudonyms. However, most LBSs require user registration, and additionally, users cannot take premium services that may be provided to active users.
We follow the dummy-based approach, because it satisfies all of the above requirements. Moreover, it is reliable since it does not need an intermediate server/device to collect or process location information. As described in Section I, we have proposed a basic concept of our dummy-based approach in [24] . Following this concept, this paper proposes a detailed method which considers physical constraints in a real environment so that generated dummies naturally behave, and reports the results of extensive experiments for performance evaluation. Some recent studies based on the spatial cloaking approach [19] , [25] also take into account some physical constraints such as geographical constraints on a road network. However, since the dummy-based approach determines exact locations for dummies (not a region as in the spatial cloaking approach), it is much more challenging to generate natural dummies under the physical constraints. We have also proposed some dummy-based privacy preserving methods in [13] and [14] . However, these methods are based on a strict and strong assumption that the user's movement plan including visiting places, their order and routes, and movement speeds are completely known in advance. In this paper, we do not make such a strong assumption since it is basically difficult to achieve in the real world.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
Our method anonymizes a user's location with dummies considering restrictions in a real environment. We assume that his/her mobile device pre-fetches a map data of an area where he/she is around. 1 Additionally, in our method, a user and dummies share the user's own registration ID on an LBS, which is beneficial both for the LBS provider and the user. The LBS provider can still obtain the information on customer behavior and charge service fees directly to the user, and the user may take specialized service from the LBS, such as service discount and personalized services. This is important for the entire ecosystem of LBSs. In this section, we first discuss the restrictions in a real environment, and then present our method in detail.
A. RESTRICTIONS IN A REAL ENVIRONMENT 1) MOVEMENT CONSISTENCY
If the current location of a dummy is unreachable (too far) from any of previous locations of a user and all dummies, (remember that an LBS provider cannot clearly distinguish them), the service provider can easily detect that this location is a dummy's one. For example, when the user has requested the LBS at a certain time and then requests the service again three minutes later, a dummy locating more than 10 [km] away from the previous locations is apparently a dummy. Therefore, we should determine dummies' locations to keep the consistency of their movement, i.e., the location of each dummy has to be within a reachable area from its previous location. In addition, we should consider actual road networks when calculating a distance between two locations, rather than a simple Euclidean distance. We also should exclude areas that people unlikely exist, such as in the sea and forests, as dummies' locations. For example, it is easy to detect a dummy if it moves from a pedestrian sidewalk to the center of highway, even though the moving distance is acceptable in terms of its moving speed.
Our method determines dummies' locations considering the actual map information to satisfy these conditions. More specifically, our method assumes each dummy continuously moves in almost the same speed as the user (i.e., they do not jump to a distant location) only on road networks.
2) TRACEABILITY
In a real environment, we should also consider the traceability of user's locations. Considering the limitation of people's movement, it might be possible to infer trajectories of a user's movement from location history that was accumulated in an LBS provider. We define the traceability as the ability to identify a user's trajectory by combining consecutive locations during a certain period. The traceability problem becomes serious especially when the user's location is accidentally detected by whatever means. If the user's locations are traceable, all previous (and possibly future) locations also become apparent. For example, as Fig. 2 (a) shows, when user's locations are traceable, the user's trajectory is easily distinguished from the dummies' ones. To lower traceability, a simple but effective approach is to cross trajectories of the user and dummies (see Fig. 2(b) ). Yanagisawa et al. proposed a method [26] to cross the user and dummies by keeping dummies waiting until the user arrives at the dummies' locations. This means that the crossing is triggered only when the user is heading to the same intersection with the dummies. However, since dummies randomly move in this method and result in spreading out in a wide area, there are fewer chances to cross the user and dummies. The methods proposed in our previous studies [13] , [14] try to cross the user and dummies by pre-determining dummies' movement plans according to the user's movement plan known in advance.
Our method proposed in this paper increases the chance to cross them by arraying dummies around the user.
3) ANONYMOUS AREA
As a criterion to evaluate how secure a user is in terms of location privacy, we define the concept of anonymity by the size of the area containing the user and dummies. For example, when dummies are located near the user as shown in Fig. 3 (a) , the anonymity of the user's location is lower. We define the anonymous area to measure the anonymity of the user's location. Following [20] , the anonymous area is defined as the size of the minimum convex covering all locations included in a service request to an LBS. Fig. 3 (b) shows larger location anonymity than Fig. 3 (a) , i.e., the anonymous area in Fig. 3 (b) is larger than that in Fig. 3 (a) . It should be noted that, in a real environment, the same anonymous area doesn't simply mean the same degree of location anonymity. For example, even though sizes of two anonymous areas are the same, more buildings are included in a big city than in a rural area, and thus, the location anonymity in a big city is higher than that in a rural area. An appropriate size of anonymous area depends on situations. Thus, in this paper, we assume that users (or applications) specify their requirement regarding the size of anonymous area (and the number of dummies).
To satisfy the requirement on the user's location anonymity, Lu et al. proposed a method to array dummies in a grid so that the size of the grid satisfies the anonymous area requirement [20] . Although this method focuses on the user's anonymous area, it takes into account neither the movement consistency nor real geographic information.
B. OUR APPROACH
When a user initiates an LBS service request, our method generates dummies around the user in a grid shape to satisfy the anonymous area requirement [24] . On the consecutive service usage (sending his/her location information to the LBS), our method simulates the dummies' movements based on the user's location and geographical information assuring the anonymous area requirement and decides dummies' next locations. Additionally, our method crosses the user and dummies to reduce the user's traceability. The following clauses describe our method step by step. 
1) INITIALIZATION
Our method considers the requirements described in the Section III.A to generate natural dummies in a real environment. When a user firstly requests an LBS service, our method generates dummies around the user in a grid as Fig. 4 shows. The width of each cell L is determined by Equation (1) to satisfy a required anonymous area:
where S is the required size of the anonymous area and N is the number of dummies.
As Fig. 4 shows, each grid cell has an index. Our method first determines a cell of the user by randomly choosing an index in order not to fix a relative location between the user and dummies. After the user's cell index is determined, the remaining cells are allocated to dummies.
The initial position of a dummy (DIP; DIP(x): vertical coordinate, DIP(y): horizontal coordinate in the Cartesian coordinate system) is determined based on Equations (2) and (3):
where UP(x) and UP(y) are the user's position, UPID is the index of the user's cell, and DPID i is the index of ith dummy.
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For example, as Fig. 4 shows, when the user is assigned the cell with UPID = 1, the dummy assigned the cell with DPID i = 5 is initially located at the position (DIP i ) that is shifted by L from the user's position in vertical and horizontal directions.
In a real environment, DIP may not be located on a road. In that case, our method locates dummies at a random point on a road that connects to the nearest intersection from the dummy's DIP.
2) MOVEMENT CONTROL OF DUMMIES
From the second usage of the LBS service, dummies' movements are simulated and their locations are determined to be reachable from their previous locations at the user's moving speed during the consecutive LBS usage.
When the user consecutively requests the LBS, our method first determines the destination of each dummy so that the user and dummies can keep a grid formation during moving. If the destinations are determined only based on the user's current position in the same way as DIP, it is difficult to completely keep a grid formation. In an ideal case, dummies can reach their destinations (and keep the grid formation), however, in practice, they can hardly achieve it due to road networks and their moving speed limitation. For example, if the user keeps moving straight in fast speed since the previous query, dummies that are not on parallel roads with the user's road cannot reach their destinations. As a result, the user results in leading a group of dummies, which makes the user location detection easy. To solve this problem, our method shifts the destination of each dummy by L in a grid according to the user's moving direction (we call this as L-shift) (see Fig. 5 ). By doing so, dummies' destinations become further than the user's current location and we can give dummies room to catch up with the user (see Fig. 6 ). Specifically, the destination of each dummy (DD) is determined based on Equations (4) and (5):
where DP denotes each dummy's position derived by the same equation with DIP, and θ denotes the moving direction of the user, which is defined as the direction from the user's current location to the intersection where the user is heading. When the calculated destinations of dummies are out of roads, we set the destinations to the nearest locations on roads from the ideal destinations to avoid generating unnatural dummies. Finally, our method determines each dummy's position as a location on a road connecting to a dummy's destination from its previous position by moving the dummy using the same speed with the user. We should note again that our method restricts dummies to move only on roads to avoid unnatural dummies.
3) TRACEABILITY REDUCTION
As we discussed in Section III.A.2, we should reduce the traceability of the user's locations. For this aim, our method crosses the user and dummies. It is important to keep consistency between behaviors of the user and dummies to make them undistinguishable. Therefore, our method also causes crossing among dummies. In addition, our method considers conditions not to distort the formation of the user and dummies by crossing. 
a: CONDITIONS TO INVOKE CROSSING
Dummies that are changed their destinations tend to be behind the user because they cannot move in parallel with the user's heading direction, i.e., they have to perform extra movements to catch up with the user. For example, let us assume a situation where dummies are located as Fig. 7 (a) depicts and the user is moving upward. In this case, when the destinations of two dummies 0 and 2 are changed to cross the user, these dummies cannot move in parallel with the user. As a result, these dummies are to be behind the user as shown in Fig. 7(b) . If this situation continues, the user results in leading dummies. The LBS provider would notice that there is always an entity leading the group. It is natural that the LBS provider suspects that the entity may be the user, which increases the possibility of the user being identified. To avoid such formation distortion, we should minimize the change of moving direction of dummies when invoking crossing. VOLUME 4, 2016 Our method verifies the following two conditions to invoke crossing when deciding destinations of dummies by the procedure in Section III.B.2. When there is no dummy ahead of the user, we should not change dummies' destinations because the user can be easily distinguished from dummies as mentioned above. Meanwhile, when some dummies move ahead of the user, it is a chance to invoke crossing. When the conditions are satisfied, our method decides new destinations of dummies so that the moving direction change on dummies becomes small.
Condition 1 (The User Is Moving Toward the Center of All Dummies):
We define the first condition as the angle (θ α ) between two vectors; 1) the vector from the user's location to the median point of all dummies' locations and 2) the vector of the user's moving direction. When θ α is smaller than 45 • , it means that the user is moving toward the median point of all dummies' locations, i.e., the user is heading for the center of dummies (see Fig. 8 ). In this situation, we can reduce the extra movements of dummies caused by crossing since the user is behind dummies. 
Condition 2 (The User Changes the Moving Direction):
The first condition is not sufficient because it causes too frequent destination changes during the user is moving to the median point of all dummies. In this case, the user tends to be fixed ahead of the median point of dummies, which can be a hint to identify the user's location.
To avoid this problem, we define the second condition as the angle between the user's current moving direction and the moving direction in the previous query (θ β ) is larger than 45 • (see Fig. 9 ). By setting this condition, destination change does not occur when the user is moving to a consistent direction. 
b: PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE DUMMIES' NEW DESTINATIONS
Our method keeps dummies' moving direction change as small as possible on crossing. Specifically, it determines dummies' new destinations by changing indexes of dummies based on the location relationships between the user and dummies.
In reality, due to restrictions of real roads, an actual formation of the user and dummies is distorted from an ideal grid (see Fig. 10 ). This distortion sometimes causes a situation in which some dummies with certain indexes are not closest ones to the corresponding ideal positions in the grid and some other dummies are incidentally closer to those positions. This means that we can change the destinations of dummies with minimum moving direction change by allocating an index of the closest ideal position in the grid. Specifically, we change the dummies' destinations as follows.
Step 1 (Determine the User's Index): The user's cell index (UPID) is selected based on dummies' locations. Specifically, our method determines UPID based on the relationship between the user position (UP) and the dummies' median point. Our method separates the area where the user and dummies exist into N (the number of dummies) square regions, L on a side, so that the dummies' median point is located at the center of the central region (see Fig. 11(a) ). Then, the user is assigned the new UPID as the index of the cell where the user exists. In Fig. 11(a) , the user is assigned UPID as 6. Step 2 (Determine Dummies' New Indexes): Next, our method determines the dummies' ideal positions in the grid in the same way with the procedure to determine DPI i in section III.B.1. Then, it detects a dummy that is closest to a DPI i and assigns the dummy a new index (DPID i ) that is the cell's index corresponding to the DPI i (see Fig. 11(b) ).
Step 3 (Determine Dummies' New Destinations): Finally, our method computes the new destinations of dummies using the new indexes based on Equations (4) and (5).
We should note that even though our method invokes crossing, the crossing does not always happen. This is because we accord natural behavior of dummies priority over traceability reduction. If we force crossing, the formation of the user and dummies is skewed, by which an LBS provider may pinpoint the user and track all his/her locations. We evaluate the effect of unnatural behaviors of dummies by asking human to distinguish the user and dummies by observation.
IV. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
In this experiment, we aim to evaluate the robustness of our method from the quantitative perspective (statistical analysis). We downloaded five real GPS trajectories of ordinary people from routelab (http://latlonglab.yahoo.co.jp/, in Japanese). All trajectories are in Kyoto, Japan and we manually modeled the road network there. On this map, we simulated users' movements based on the GPS trajectories using recorded latitude and longitude, since time stamps of the recording time are not available. The results show the average over these five trajectories. We used the network simulator MobiREAL (http://www.mobireal.net) to simulate the movement of a user and dummies. Since there are no existing dummy-based approaches that assume a real environment, it was difficult to directly compare our method with other existing approaches. Therefore, we compared our method with a simple baseline method and PAD method [20] , which also uses dummies and considers anonymous area requirement. 2 ], which represents a general walking speed [5] .
The number of dummies is an important factor on our method. For example, a larger number of dummies reduce time to cross the user and dummies, i.e., easier to reduce the traceability. However, since mobile devices are basically constrained in resources such as network bandwidth and users generally want to reduce the service usage cost (more dummies mean more service requests and usage cost) in many real situations, the number of dummies should be reduced as much as possible, i.e., to be minimum number that ensures the user's privacy requirement. Its optimal number depends on each area where the user uses the LBS. In our evaluation, we evaluated three different numbers of dummies, 16, 25, and 36 (these numbers include the user, i.e. real numbers of dummies are 15, 24, and 35).
A service request frequency also affects the robustness of the proposed method. When the service request interval (cycle) is small, lowering the traceability of the user's locations is difficult since chances to cross the user and dummies are reduced. We also examine the effect of the service request cycle.
B. METHODS FOR COMPARISON
In this evaluation, we compared the following five methods.
• Destination exchange method [Dest-Ex] (proposed method): Our method with all functionalities.
• No destination exchange method [No-Dest-Ex] (proposed method): Our method without traceability reduction.
• PAD based method [PAD] (based on Lu et al. [20] ): This method determines dummies' destinations based on the user's location, and then decides dummy locations in the same way with our method. We should note that the original PAD method does not consider geographical restrictions. To enable comparison with our methods, we modified the PAD method to locate dummies only on roads. Therefore, this method is basically identical to our method without L-Shift and traceability reduction.
• PAD based destination exchange method [PAD-DestEx]: PAD based method with traceability reduction. This method is basically identical to our method without L-Shift.
• Random movement method [Ran-Move]: Dummies move on randomly chosen roads in the circle with the radius of √ S/π (S denotes the size of the required anonymous area) around the user.
C. EVALUATION METRICS
To measure the performance of each method in terms of anonymity satisfaction and traceability reduction, we used the following evaluation criteria.
1) ANONYMOUS AREA ACHIEVING RATIO (AAAR)
This metric aims to measure a satisfaction rate of an anonymous area requirement. More specifically, we calculated the average size of anonymous areas which are the minimum convex covering all locations of dummies and the user for all service requests issued during the simulation time. AAAR is defined as the ratio of the average size of the anonymous area to the required size of the anonymous area. Thus, AAAR becomes more than 100% when the average size of anonymous areas is larger than the requirement.
2) VARIANCE OF USER LOCATION RANK (VULR)
As mentioned earlier, if relative locations between the user and dummies are static, e.g., the user is always leading dummies, it is easy to distinguish the user from dummies. To measure a possibility that such situations happen, we examine a variance of a rank of the user's location among dummies' locations regarding the user's moving direction. For each service request, we recorded a rank (1st, 2nd, etc.) of the user's location among all dummies' locations. We decided the rank based on their relative positions and the user's moving direction. For example, the rank is 1 if the user leads all dummies. Then, we calculated the ratio of occurrences of each rank to the total number of requests issued during the simulation time. VULR is defined as the variance of the ratio of all ranks. Therefore, VULR becomes 0 if all ranks occurred equally, i.e., the user's relative locations were perfectly distributed during the simulation time. On the other hand, VULR becomes larger if a particular rank occurred frequently, i.e., the user tends to stay at a particular relative location.
3) MEAN TIME TO CONFUSION (MTC)
Each queried location has a probability of being the user's location. When the user's location is accidentally identified, e.g., by a report of sighting in a real environment or by a user himself/herself tweeting his location on Twitter, the probability of the location being the user's is 1. We defined the stochastic transition of the possibility for each location as follows.
FIGURE 12.
Transition of probability to be the user when dummies go inside the union of their reachable area.
As Fig. 12 shows, when a location with the probability of being the user's location α and another location with the probability β are located in an area that is reachable from both of their previous locations, these two locations cannot be distinguished. In this situation, the probability of both locations is (α + β)/2. To measure the traceability in our evaluation, we use Mean Time to Confusion (MTC) defined in [23] . MTC is defined as the mean time that is necessary to anonymize the user's location from the accidental reveal by the LBS provider. Every time a service request is issued, we calculate the entropy of the probability of being the user's location by Equation (6),
where p i is the probability of a location i to be user's location, and D is the set of all locations corresponding to the user and all dummies. In our evaluation, we defined MTC as the mean time period from the time when H becomes 0 (when the user's location is revealed) to the time when H exceeds 1 (when we can regard that the user's location is anonymized). In this evaluation, we assumed that the user's location is revealed at every simulation time step and measured the mean time period until the user's location is anonymized for all cases. Smaller MTC means lower user traceability.
D. EVALUATION RESULTS

1) ANONYMOUS AREA ACHIEVING RATIO (AAAR)
For all numbers of dummies (N = 16, 25, 36), their AAARs showed almost the same characteristics. Therefore, we only show the results of N = 36 and discuss the results. Fig. 13 shows AAARs with various anonymous area requirements.
FIGURE 13. Anonymous area achieving ratio (N = 36).
From the result, the proposed method, its variation, and the PAD based methods achieved more than 150% of AAARs when the anonymous area requirement was smaller than 200 2 [m 2 ]. When the anonymous area requirement is small, the grid size also becomes small and dummies are gathered in a small area. In this situation, when positions of dummies are changed from the ideal locations in a grid formation due to restrictions in the road network, the impact of this distortion is large. Therefore, the anonymous area became larger than the requirement. The result shows that the impact of increasing anonymous area size (even if the increase is small) on AAAR becomes larger as the anonymous area requirement gets smaller.
When the anonymous area requirement was larger than 200 2 [m 2 ], the proposed method, its variation, and the PAD based methods achieved about 100% AAAR, which shows the effectiveness of arraying dummies in a grid formation. However, AAARs of the Dest-Ex and PAD-Dest-Ex methods were lower than 100% when the anonymous area requirement was larger than 900 2 [m 2 ], which was 19% lower than that of the No-Dest-Ex method. This shows a negative impact of the traceability reduction process regarding AAAR, which occasionally shrinks the grid to cross the user and dummies. Therefore, to ensure complete satisfaction of anonymous area requirement, the grid size of the Dest-Ex and PAD-Dest-Ex methods should be larger than that of the anonymous area requirement.
AAARs of the random movement method were 72% to 80% lower than that of the Dest-Ex and PAD-Dest-Ex methods. Since dummies move in random directions, they tended to gather around the opposite side of the user's moving direction when the user moved straight (see Fig. 14) . In this situation, the anonymous area became small and could not satisfy the user's anonymous area requirement. 
2) VARIANCE OF USER LOCATION RANK (VULR)
Similar to AAAR, VULRs showed almost the same characteristics for all the three numbers of dummies. Thus, we only show the results of N = 36. Fig. 15 shows VULRs when varying the anonymous area requirement. When the anonymous area requirement was smaller than 200 2 [m 2 ], VULRs of all methods except for the random movement method rapidly increased as the anonymous area requirement got smaller. This is because when the anonymous area requirement is small, dummies are to be located near the user. In this case, the user tends to lead dummies when changing the moving direction.
For all cases of anonymous area requirements, VULRs of the Dest-Ex method were 1.2 to 3 times larger than that of the No-Dest-Ex method. This is because, as described in Section III.B.3, dummies cannot move in parallel with the user's moving direction when they change their destinations and the user leads dummies more often than the No-Dest-Ex method. The same phenomena happened between the PAD and PAD-Dest-Ex methods. For most cases, VULRs of the PAD based methods were smaller than that of the proposed method. This shows the effectiveness of L-shift in our method to avoid the user leading dummies.
The Dest-Ex method suppressed VULRs lower than 0.001 when the anonymous area requirement was larger than 200 2 [m 2 ]. We can regard 0.001 as a negligibly small value. We visually observed the simulation and confirmed that only approximately 5% of the simulation time the user was leading dummies. This result shows that our Dest-Ex method can control the dummies' movements to prevent the user from being distinguished from dummies.
In most cases of the anonymous area requirement, VULRs of the random movement method were more than 20 times larger than that of the other methods. This is because, as described in Section IV.D.1, dummies tend to gather around the opposite side of the user's moving direction and the user often leads the dummies. Actually, we examined the results in more detail and confirmed that the user was leading dummies for 20% to 40% of the simulation period. Fig. 16 shows MTCs for the case of N = 36 when varying the anonymous area requirement. MTCs of the Dest-Ex and the No-Dest-Ex methods were almost the same when the anonymous area requirement was small. This is because dummies were located closer to the user and the user's location was within the dummies' reachable areas in most cases, i.e., there is basically no need to artificially cross the user and dummies.
3) MEAN TIME TO CONFUSION (MTC)
When the anonymous area requirement was large, MTCs of the Dest-Ex method were 10% to 40% lower than that of the No-Dest-Ex method. This result shows the effectiveness of traceability reduction in the Dest-Ex method. In particular, when the anonymous area requirement was larger than 1500 2 [m 2 ], we confirmed from the observation of the simulation result that the No-Dest-Ex method crossed the user and dummies only a few times in the entire simulation. MTCs of the Dest-Ex method also became larger as the anonymous area requirement increased. It became more difficult to cross the user and dummies because the density of dummies became smaller. Compared to the PAD-Dest-Ex method, the Dest-Ex method achieved 15% to 37% lower MTCs for all cases of the anonymous area requirements. This is because, in the PAD-Dest-Ex method, the user tended to lead dummies and hardly crossed with the dummies behind.
Compared with the other methods, the random movement method achieved smaller MTCs even though the anonymous area requirement was large. Since this method does not restrict a dummy's movement, the user and dummies have more chance to (naturally) cross with each other than the other methods. This is why the influence of increase of anonymous area requirement became smaller than the other methods. 
4) EFFECT OF SERVICE REQUEST CYCLE
According to the investigation conducted by Busic and Filjar [7] , commercial LBSs require frequent service requests with intervals of a few minutes. Based on this fact, we varied the service request cycle to evaluate its effect regarding the traceability, i.e., MTC. We should note that the lower bound of MTC corresponds to the service request cycle, since we evaluated MTC upon user's service request. As we expected, MTCs exponentially became large as the service request cycle becomes small. We found that the Dest-Ex method achieved the lowest MTC when the service request cycle was smaller than 300 [s] . This result shows the effectiveness of crossing the user and dummies.
Regarding the Dest-Ex and No-Dest-Ex methods, we could anonymize the user (after being detected the location) in consecutive 3 service usage when the service request cycle was larger than 180 [s] . We regard this is acceptable in practical use.
V. USER EXPERIMENT
In the previous section, we quantitatively evaluated the characteristics of our method and showed that it can preserve users' location privacy compared to the PAD based methods. In this experiment, we qualitatively evaluate the method to see whether humans can distinguish a real user and dummies by observing their location histories. This experiment is more challenging for our method since humans can have much better sense to detect unnatural movement of dummies. Table 2 summarizes parameters and their values used in our evaluation. We recruited 22 participants from our research laboratory, 18 males and 4 females of from 21 to 25 years old. We developed a system (Fig. 18) to show simulated movements of a user and 15 dummies generated by our method (Dest-Ex and No-Dest-Ex methods) and the PAD based methods on a real map. The user and dummies were given ID as Fig. 18 shows, and these IDs were randomized in . As a whole, we conducted the experiment in 48 different conditions (4 methods, 4 anonymous area requirements, and 3 service request cycles), and for each condition, we selected 12 variations of user's walking trajectory categorized in 4 groups based on the user's basic movement (moving straight, returning, turning right, and turning left), i.e., 3 data for each. Adapting to the shortest data segment we cut from the original data, the maximum duration of the simulation was set to 2880 [s] . In this experiment, movements in each condition were judged 48 times (4 times for each data). Participation to this experiment was purely voluntary. Therefore, the number of evaluations that a participant conducted considerably varied among participants. Thus, for each condition, the number of evaluations conducted by each participant ranges from 1 to 4.
We asked the participants to observe movements of a user and dummies and to conduct the following two tasks. First, we asked participants to stop the simulation when they can identify the user, and to specify the ID which they think the user. We also asked the participant to tell us facts that enabled him/her to identify the user. In this task, we aim to examine how difficult to visually distinguish the user from dummies, by calculating the ratio of correct answers (RCA). Second, we let the participants know the initial ID of the user and observe the movements of the user and dummies. We asked participants to stop the simulation when they lose the user. In this task, we aim to examine how difficult to visually trace the user, by calculating the average traceable period (TP).
During the experiment, participants could change (and pause) the playback speed of a user and dummies' movements and scale up and down the map. We randomized the order of experimental conditions assigned to participants to keep the fairness of the experiment. 24 .7% (7.3%), and 17.1% (7.4%) and that of PAD based methods were 39.0% (8.25%), 33.0% (8.4%), and 35.0% (3.6%). From the result, participants could not easily identify the user visually, thus, we can confirm that our method basically can preserve the location privacy from the visual perspective.
As a whole characteristic of RCA, we found three points as follow.
• The methods with L-shift achieve smaller RCAs than the methods without L-shift. As shown above, the methods with L-shift achieved smaller RCAs in all service request cycles.
• RCA decreases with larger service request cycle. • RCA first gets larger when we increase the anonymous area requirement, but stable or smaller when the anonymous area requirement is larger than 1500 2 [m 2 ]. Additionally, from the answers provided by the participants, we found that there were typically two reasons why participants could identify the user; 1) the user tends to lead dummies (leading dummies) and 2) the dummies tend to follow the user's change of direction (direction change). In the following, we discuss why the above three characteristics of RCAs occurred based on the two typical reasons.
1) LEADING DUMMIES
The ratios of participants who answered ''leading dummies'' as the reason of identifying the user were 43% to 84% smaller for the methods with L-shift than the methods without L-shift (PAD based methods). Comparing the two methods with L-shift (Dest-Ex and No-Dest-Ex methods), ''leading dummies'' was larger for the method with destination exchange (Dest-Ex method).
From this result, we can confirm that 1) L-shift was effective to avoid the user to lead dummies, and 2) changing dummies' destinations caused delay on their movements because dummies were difficult to follow the user's movement due to different destinations from the user's.
In four cases of moving patterns, the ratio of ''leading dummies'' when moving straight and returning were almost the half of that when turning left or right across different parameter settings. For example, the average ratios of ''leading dummies'' for moving straight and returning were 6.9% and 6.5%, whereas that for turning left and right were 10.2% and 12.0%. This is because, there were less chances of changing destinations with moving straight, and it was rare to lead dummies when the user returned. This tendency was also observed for the ratio of ''direction change''.
On the other hand, tuning anonymous area requirement and service request cycle did not decrease the possibility of user identification by his/her leading dummies. This result shows that we have to seek for another way to further reduce the ratio. To reduce the possibility of leading dummies, our method should incorporate the function of predicting a user's movement and change dummies moving direction before the user actually changes it.
2) DIRECTION CHANGE
The ratio of participants who identified a user at a time of direction change tended to decrease as the service request cycle increases. This is because with the larger service request cycle, the chances of observing the exact timing of the user's direction change decreases, which makes it difficult for participants to distinguish dummies.
Moreover, the ratio of participants who answered ''direction change'' as the reason in the correct answers were larger for the methods without destination exchange (No-Dest-Ex and PAD methods) than that with destination exchange (see Figs. 19, 20, and 21) . This is because without destination exchange, most dummies moved parallel with the user's moving direction, which made dummies to follow the user's direction change. Based on these tendencies of service request cycle and destination exchange, RCA of the PAD method was largely affected by ''direction change'', and it was larger than that of the PAD-Ex method when service request cycle was 60 [s], whereas it was smaller in the case of 180 [s] .
In most cases, the ratio of the correct answer by ''direction change'' out of whole RCA increased, as the anonymous area requirement increased. For smaller anonymous area requirement, dummies gathered very near from the user's location and could not always move in a grid formation due to the restriction of roads. As a result, dummies tended to move various directions to keep a grid as much as possible, which positively affected and made difficult for participants to identify the user with the reason of ''direction change''. Based on this fact, the ratio of ''direction change'' in all of the reasons increased from 22% to 44% as the anonymous area requirement increased from 500 2 When the service request cycle was 180 [s], the No-Dest-Ex method did not follow the same characteristic with other two cases of service request cycle. As mentioned above, the ratio of participants who answered ''direction change'' as the reason was small in this setting. Therefore, we expected that RCA in this case rarely increased as the anonymous area requirement increased. However, the No-Dest-Ex method showed exceptionally high RCA when the anonymous area requirement was 1500 2 [m 2 ]. This was caused by some participants who are very good at identifying the user. They inferred the user not only from ''direction change'', but also from the road information, e.g. ''the user tends to move on a busy street''. For the case that the anonymous area requirement is 1500 2 [m 2 ], those highly skilled participants were accidentally gathered for the evaluation.
As the result, RCA in this case became very high. This implies that dummies can be detected by using road information. Therefore, we need to take into consideration such road information to make our method more robust in a real environment.
3) TENDENCY OF AGGREGATED (OVERALL) RESULT From Figs. 19, 20 and 21 , RCAs tended to get larger at first when we increased the anonymous area requirement, but stable or smaller when the anonymous area requirement was larger than 1500 2 [m 2 ]. This is caused by the characteristics of ''leading dummies'' and ''direction change''. Inferring the user from ''leading dummies'' becomes easier as the anonymous area requirement decreases, because the user easily sticks out from dummies with a small grid formation. On the other hand, inferring from ''direction change'' becomes easier as the anonymous area requirement increases as described before. This tendency implies that the easiest parameter setting for participants was 1500 2 [m 2 ] because they can use both factors for inferring the user. Fig. 16 . TPs of the Dest-Ex method were 18% to 28% lower than that of the No-Dest-Ex method. This shows that exchanging destinations is actually effective to decrease the traceability against human observation. Compared with the proposed method, the PAD based methods showed larger TPs. For example, TPs of the PAD method were 1% to 27% larger than that of the No-Dest-Ex method, and TPs of the PAD-Ex method were 6% to 48% larger than that of the Dest-Ex method. This is because the user tended to lead dummies in the PAD based methods and its location relationship with dummies made it difficult to cross dummies with the user.
VI. DISCUSSION A. SUMMARY AND OUTCOMES OF THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Only regarding MTC, the random movement method was the best. However, VULR of this method was 20 times larger than the proposed method, its variation, and the PAD method, and 5 times larger than the PAD-Dest-Ex method. Thus, this method suffers the user's location privacy. Moreover, the random movement method cannot satisfy the anonymous area requirement. Therefore, we can conclude that this method is not robust in a real environment.
As we compare the proposed method and its variation with PAD based methods, MTC of the No-Dest-Ex method was almost the same with that of the PAD based methods. However, for all anonymous area requirements, the No-Dest-Ex method achieved 3% to 30% higher AAARs, and 60% to 75% lower VULRs than PAD based methods, due to the effectiveness of L-shift. Moreover, the Dest-Ex method achieved 19% to 37% lower MTCs, and 47% to 80% lower VULRs than the PAD-Dest-Ex method. These results show that the proposed method and its variation can reduce MTC and VULR compared with the PAD based methods. These tendencies were also observed in RCA and TP of the visual observation experiments.
In terms of RCA, our method and its variation achieved lower RCA than that of PAD based methods for most of service request cycles. In particular, when the service request cycle was 180 [s], our methods achieved lower RAC than PAD based methods for all of anonymous area requirement.
In practice, we should choose the Dest-Ex method or the No-Dest-Ex method depending on the anonymous area requirement. When the anonymous area requirement is small, MTCs of the two methods are similar, and AAAR and VULR of the No-Dest-Ex method were better than that of the DestEx method. Additionally, RCA and TP of the No-Dest-Ex method are better than that of the Dest-Ex method in visual observation. Therefore, in this case, we should choose the NoDest-Ex method. With large anonymous area requirement, the Dest-Ex method can significantly reduce MTC compared with the No-Dest-Ex method, and the differences of AAAR and VULR between these two methods are trivial. Additionally, in most cases, RCA and TP of the Dest-Ex method were better than that of the No-Dest-Ex method in visual observation. Therefore, in this case, it is worth reducing traceability by crossing the user and dummies, and we may choose the Dest-Ex method. Taking the center area of Kyoto (where we used for the experiment) as an example, it generally needs 800 2 [m 2 ] to include more than 1000 buildings. Therefore, the No-Dest-Ex method seems to be suitable for this area.
Choosing a method and setting ideal parameters would be tiresome and difficult, thus, the system should automatically set up appropriate ones based on the user's requirements and the characteristics of the environment around the user. For this aim, we will investigate how users concern about the anonymous area and MTC in detail in future.
B. HOW TO IMPLEMENT OUR METHOD IN REAL SITUATIONS
Our method can be applied to any LBS applications that accept multiple requests from a user, since it does not require a special third party for preserving privacy and the change of the server side-programs. Our method is expected to run as a client-side program, e.g., smart phone application, on the top of LBS applications, where users can specify their requirements on the anonymous area and MTC, and the number of dummies (which corresponds extra cost/overhead). As mentioned, it is more desirable that the system, i.e., clientside program, can automatically set or recommend these parameters for the users.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a method to anonymize a user's location to preserve location privacy in a real environment when using LBSs with mobile devices. The proposed method generates and arrays dummies around the user in a grid formation considering geographical constraints. It simulates dummies' movement to be natural so that an LBS provider cannot distinguish the user from dummies. In addition, our method lets dummies to cross with the user to reduce the traceability of the user's locations.
We conducted an experiment to evaluate the robustness of our method in a real environment. We used 5 GPS trajectories and compared our method; its 2 kinds of variations (the Dest-Ex and the No-Dest-Ex methods) and a baseline and conventional methods; the random movement method and the PAD based methods. As a result, the Dest-Ex and the No-Dest-Ex methods satisfied the anonymous area requirement for 50% and 100% of time, respectively, achieving smaller VULR than comparison methods. Furthermore, the Dest-Ex method decreased the traceable period 15% than that of the No-Dest-Ex method. When the anonymous area requirement was small, the Dest-Ex and No-Dest-Ex methods were comparable, while when the anonymous area requirement was large, the Dest-Ex method reduced MTC more than 40% than the No-Dest-Ex method. Therefore, users can choose which method to use based on their environmental situations and anonymous area requirement.
Additionally, we conducted a visual observation experiment with 22 people. As a result, our method achieved lower RCA compared with comparison methods for most of parameter settings. Moreover, we confirmed that destination exchange is effective in reducing traceability also in visual observation. However, we found some new issues which are open to our future work. For example, in our method, dummies tend to follow the user's direction change, which can be a hint to identify the user from dummies. We also found that some highly skilled participants can infer the user with high probability from several factors that we know in our real life (e.g., people tend to move on a busy street). We will investigate such factors in more detail and extend our method to take them into account. VOLUME 4, 2016 Our method considers the reachability of locations on a road network in successive queries and also relative positions of a user in a grid formation. Therefore, our method is robust against inference attacks based on geographical constraints, i.e., an adversary cannot distinguish a user from dummies using the geographical constraints. However, it may not be robust against other types of inference attacks such as that based on location semantics like categories of visiting places, e.g., café and hospital. Some recent studies on location privacy preserving (not dummy-based approaches) [1] , [18] take location semantics into account. We plan to extend our method to take such location semantics and other factors into account when generating dummies. 
